Q102716: User Authentication with Windows NT
Article: Q102716
Product(s): Microsoft Windows NT
Version(s): WinNT:3.1
Operating System(s):
Keyword(s): kbother
Last Modified: 08-AUG-2001
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The information in this article applies to:
- Microsoft Windows NT Server version 3.1
- Microsoft Windows NT Workstation version 3.1
- Microsoft Windows NT Advanced Server, version 3.1
- Microsoft Windows NT Workstation versions 3.51, 4.0
- Microsoft Windows NT Server versions 3.51, 4.0
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SUMMARY
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This article discusses the following aspects of user authentication:
- Storage of the Passwords in the SAM Database
- User Authentication by the MSV1_0 Authentication Package
- Pass-Through Authentication
MORE INFORMATION
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Storage of the Passwords in the SAM Database
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User records are stored in the security accounts manager (SAM) database. Each
user has two passwords with which it is associated: the LAN Manager compatible
password and the Windows NT password. Each password is stored doubly encrypted
in the SAM database. The first encryption is a one-way function (OWF) version of
the clear text generally considered to be non-decryptable. The second encryption
is an encryption of the user's relative ID (RID). The second encryption is
decryptable by anyone who has access to the double-encrypted password, the
user's RID, and the algorithm. The second encryption is used for obfuscation
purposes.
The LAN Manager compatible password is 100 percent compatible with the password
used by LAN Manager. It is based on the original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
character set, not case sensitive (enforced by upper casing before encryption),
and up to 14 characters long. The OWF version (called the LAN Manager OWF or
ESTD version) of the password is computed by encrypting a constant with the
clear text password using DES encryption. The LAN Manager OWF password is 16
bytes long. The first 7 bytes of the clear text password are used to compute the
first 8 bytes of the LAN Manager OWF password. The second 7 bytes of the clear
text password are used to computer the second 8 bytes of the LAN Manager OWF
password.
The Windows NT password is based on the Unicode character set, is case sensitive,
and can be up to 128 characters long. The OWF version (called the Windows NT OWF
password) is computed using the RSA MD-4 encryption algorithm, which computes a
16-byte "digest" of a variable length string of clear text password bytes.
Any particular user account might be missing either the LAN Manager or Windows NT
password, however, every attempt is made to maintain both versions of the
password. For instance, only the LAN Manager version of the password exists if
the user account was ported from a LAN Manager UAS database using PortUas or if
the password was changed from a LAN Manager or Windows for Workgroups client.
Only the Windows NT version of the password exists if the password is set or
changed from a Windows NT client and the password has no LAN Manager
representation (that is, it is longer than 14 characters or the characters
cannot be represented in the OEM character set). All the existing user interface
limits do not allow Windows NT passwords to exceed 14 characters. The
implications of this are discussed below.
NOTE: Altering of the SAM database by any means, manually or programmatically, is
unsupported by Microsoft.
User Authentication by the MSV1_0 Authentication Package
--------------------------------------------------------
All user authentication in Windows NT occurs using the LsaLogonUser API.
LsaLogonUser actually authenticates users by calling an authentication package.
The default authentication package that comes with Windows NT is the MSV1_0
Authentication Package. The MSV Authentication Package uses the SAM database as
its database of users, and it supports pass-through authentication of users in
other domains by using the Netlogon service.
Internally, the MSV authentication package is split into two halves: a top half
and a bottom half. The top half executes on the machine being logged onto (or
connected to). The bottom half executes on the machine that contains the user
account. When both machines are the same machine, the MSV Authentication Package
top half simply calls the bottom half without involving the Netlogon service.
When the MSV authentication package top half recognizes that pass-through
authentication is needed (based on the fact that the domain name passed to it is
not its own domain name), MSV passes the request to the Netlogon service, which
routes the request to the Netlogon service on the appropriate machine, which in
turn passes the request to the bottom half of the MSV Authentication Package on
that machine.
LsaLogonUser supports interactive logons, service logons, and network logons. All
forms of logon through the MSV Authentication Package pass the name of the
domain containing the user account, the name of the user account, and some
function of the user's password. These different types of logon differ in the
way the password is represented as it is passed to LsaLogonUser.
For interactive logons and service logons, the client logging on is physically on
the machine running the top half of the MSV Authentication Package. In this
case, the clear text password is passed into LsaLogonUser and the top half of
the MSV Authentication Package. The top half of the MSV Authentication Package
converts the clear text password to both a LAN Manager OWF password and a
Windows NT OWF password before passing it on to either the Netlogon service or
the lower half. The lower half queries the OWF passwords from SAM and compares
the OWF passwords to ensure they are identical.
For network logons, the client connecting to the machine was previously given a
16-byte challenge (or "nonce"). If the client is a LAN Manager client, the
client computed a 24-byte challenge response by encrypting the 16-byte challenge
with the 16-byte LAN Manager OWF password. This is the algorithm used by LAN
Manager. The LAN Manager client passes this "LAN Manager Challenge Response" to
the Windows NT server. If the client is an Windows NT client, the client
computed a LAN Manager Challenge Response, just as above. In addition, the
Windows NT client computes an "Windows NT Challenge Response" by using the
identical algorithm but using the 16-byte Windows NT OWF password instead of the
LAN Manager OWF password. The Windows NT client then passes both the LAN Manager
Challenge Response and the Windows NT Challenge Response to the Windows NT
server. In either case, the Windows NT server authenticates the user by passing
all of the following to LsaLogonUser: the domain name, the user name, the
original challenge, the LAN Manager Challenge Response, and the optional Windows
NT Challenge Response. The top half of the MSV Authentication Pack passes this
unchanged to the bottom half. The bottom half queries the OWF passwords from
SAM, computes the appropriate Challenge Response using the OWF password from SAM
and the passed in Challenge, then compares the computed challenge response to
the one passed in.
As mentioned above, either the Windows NT password or LAN Manager password might
be missing from the SAM database. Also, either the Windows NT password (or a
function thereof) or the LAN Manager password might be missing from the call to
LsaLogonUser. This paragraph describes which passwords are compared in which
cases. If both the Windows NT version of password from SAM and the Windows NT
version of the password from LsaLogonUser are available, they are both used.
Otherwise, the LAN Manager version of the password is used to compare against.
This rule allows case sensitivity to be enforced when going Windows NT to
Windows NT, but it also allows backward compatibility.
Pass-Through Authentication
---------------------------
The NetLogon service implements pass-through authentication. Its role is three
fold: it selects the domain to pass the authentication request to, it selects
the server within the domain, and it actually passes the authentication request
through to the selected server.
Selecting the domain is straightforward. The domain name is passed to
LsaLogonUser. The domain name is processed as follows:
- If the domain name matches the name of the SAM database, the authentication
is processed on that machine. The name of the SAM database on a Windows NT
workstation that is a member of a domain is considered to the name of the
Windows NT machine. The name of the SAM database on a Windows NT Advanced
Server is the name of the domain. All logons to Windows NT machines that are
not members of a domain process requests locally.
- If the domain name specified is trusted by this domain, the authentication
request is passed through to the trusted domain. On Windows NT Advanced
Server, the list of trusted domains is readily available so this comparison
is trivial. On a Windows NT workstation, the request is always passed through
to the primary domain of the workstation, allowing the primary domain to
determine if the specified domain is trusted.
- If the domain name specified is not trusted by this domain, the
authentication request is processed on the machine being connected to as if
the domain name specified were that domain name. NetLogon does not
differentiate between a nonexistent domain, an untrusted domain, and an
incorrectly typed domain name.
Some network clients don't specify the domain name. These clients include Windows
for Workgroups 3.1 and LAN Manager OS/2 version 2.2. A patch is available to LAN
Manager OS/2 2.2 that causes it to pass a domain name. A Windows NT workstation
handles this NULL domain name by checking to see if the account exists locally.
If so, the request is processed locally; otherwise, the request is passed to the
primary domain. The Windows NT Advanced Server also checks if the account exists
locally. If so, the request is processed locally; otherwise, the Advanced Server
tries to determine if a trusted domain has the account. If does this by sending
a second-class mailslot message to each trusted domain. Each trusted domain
responds indicating whether it defines the account specified. The request is
passed through to the first domain that responds affirmatively. If no domain
responds affirmatively, this NULL domain is treated as an untrusted domain (as
described above). If more than one domain responds affirmatively, only the first
response is used. (This is a strong argument for upgrading clients that pass
NULL domain names and having only a single account for any particular user in
the enterprise.)
NetLogon picks a server in the domain by a process called "discovery." A Windows
NT workstation "discovers" the name of one of the Windows NT Advanced Servers in
its primary domain. A Windows NT Advanced Server "discovers" the name of an
Windows NT Advanced Server in each trusted domain.
Pass-through authentication is merely an I_NetLogonSamLogon API call over the
secure channel. If the logon call is an interactive logon, Netlogon encrypts the
OWF passwords with the secure channel session key before passing them to the
NetLogon service. The session key encrypted OWF passwords are decrypted before
they are passed to the bottom half of the MSV authentication package.
Additional query words: wfw wfwg prodnt
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Keywords : kbother
Technology : kbWinNTsearch kbWinNTWsearch kbWinNTW400 kbWinNTW400search kbWinNT351search kbWinNT400search kbWinNTW351search kbWinNTW351 kbWinNTW310 kbWinNTSsearch kbWinNTS400search kbWinNTS400 kbWinNTS351 kbWinNTS310 kbWinNTAdvSerSearch kbWinNTAdvServ310 kbWinNTS351search kbWinNTS310search kbWinNT310Search kbWinNTW310Search
Version : WinNT:3.1
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